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Cross-border Litigation Involving Canadian and U.S. Litigants
Bruno A. Ristau *
I.

CONVENTION ON THE SERVICE ABROAD OF JUDICIAL AND

EXTRAJUDICIAL DOCUMENTS IN CIVIL OR
COMMERCIAL MATTERS

Overview of the Convention
and ExtrajuThe Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial
dicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters1 ("Hague Service
Convention" or "Convention") was developed at the Tenth Session of
the Hague Conference on Private International Law ("Hague Conference"), which the United States joined in 1964. The purpose of this Convention was to modernize and revise the Hague Conventions on Civil
Procedure of 1905 and 1954. Currently more than two dozen states are
parties to the Convention.
The Hague Service Convention establishes a multilateral regime
among the states which become parties, by ratification or accession, for
the service of legal documents abroad in "civil or commercial" matters.'
The Convention consists of thirty-one articles, divided into three chapters. Chapter I defines the meaning of "Judicial Documents" and establishes the Convention machinery. Chapter II deals with private
documents, not related to litigation, which may nonetheless require formal service. Chapter III contains general clauses. The Convention addresses five different areas:
(1) the methods by which service ofjudicial and other documents may
be made in another country;
(2) language requirements;
(3) proof of service;
(4) default judgments; and
(5) costs and fees related to service.
When a state becomes a party to the Convention it is required to
designate at least one "Central Authority." However, federal states may
designate more than one such authority. The Central Authority has the
responsibility for receiving requests for service from other states and for
* Partner, Ristau & Abbell, Washington, D.C.
1 Done at the Hague November 15, 1965; entered into force for the United States February 10,
1969; 20 U.S.T. 361; T.I.A.S. No. 6638; reprinted(with declarations) in 28 U.S.C.A., note to Rule 4,
Fed.R.Civ.P.
2 Article 1.
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executing these requests.' "Requests" for service are to be made on a
form set forth in an annex to the Convention.' The request must be accompanied by the document to be serviced, and a "summary" of that
document 5 as prescribed in a second form set forth in the annex. Legalization of the requests is not required.'
The Convention allows three possible methods of service:
(1) under a method prescribed by the internal law of the country of
service for domestic actions;
(2) pursuant to a particular method requested by the applicant; and
(3) by voluntary acceptance by the addressee.
inconsistent
The second and third methods may not be used if they are
7
made.
be
to
is
service
where
country
the
of
laws
the
with
Requests for service under the Convention may be made in French
or English, as well as in the language of the country where the document
is to be served.' However, if the document is to be served under method
into the official
one or two described above, a translation of the document
9
required.
be
may
service
of
country
the
of
language
If a request for service is deficient, the Central Authority of the receiving state is required to notify the applicant promptly and to specify
10
which a state may reits objections to the request. The grounds upon
1
limited.
extremely
are
request
fuse to execute a
Once service is completed, the Central Authority of the receiving
state is required to complete a "certificate" on a third form annexed to
the Convention. 2 This certificate establishes that either service has been
service has not been made, and
made, and the particulars thereof, or that
13
made.
been
not
has
it
why
the reasons
With respect to default, the Convention provides that if service has
been effected but the defendant has not appeared, a default judgment
may not be entered until certain facts concerning service have been established. 4 (A country may vary by declaration which facts are to be considered under certain conditions." Many countries have made such
declarations.) Additionally, the Convention permits relief from default
3 Article 2. The Central Authority for the United States, for example, is the U.S. Department
of Justice.
4 Article 3.
5 Articles 3 & 5.
6 Article 3.
7 Article 5.

8 Article 7.
9 Id.
10 Article 4.
11 Article 13.

12 See Annex to the Convention.
13 Article 6.
14 Article 15.
15 Id.
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judgments under prescribed conditions.16 A number of states have made
declarations limiting the time within which applications for relief from
default judgments may be filed.
The Convention places limits on the costs payable in connection
with service of documents under its provisions.1 7 Several countries' declarations contain additional provisions relating to such costs.
In addition to the three conventional methods of service, the Convention permits service (without compulsion) through the diplomatic or
consular agents of a contracting State.1 8 States may, by declaration, limit
the right to make such service to only the nationals of the requesting
State. Most contracting states have made such a declaration. The Convention also permits "sending" (note the language "send" rather than
"serve") documents by mail to recipients abroad, and the direct service
of documents to judicial authorities in the State of destination (bypassing
the Central Authority), unless states declare their opposition to such procedures.
Several states have declared that they are opposed to such
procedures.
The declarations of the country to which a request for service will be
made must be studied carefully before making the request, because the
declarations vary the effect of the Convention in a given State. In the
United States, procedures for service abroad are available in federal as
well as state courts. To the extent that a state's method for service of
judicial documents abroad is inconsistent with the Convention, the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution mandates that the
inconsistent state procedures not be employed.
Issues under the Hague Service Convention
Since the Convention's entry into force, a number of issues have
arisen concerning its construction and operation. One noteworthy issue
relates to the scope of the Convention. The Convention does not define
the term "civil or commercial matters," which determines its scope. Because the term is not defined, it is interpreted differently by each state.
There is agreement that criminal matters fall outside the Convention's
scope. However, some countries also exclude administrative, fiscal, and
family law matters when these issues are not characterized as "civil or
commercial" under their internal laws.
Another issue relates to whether the Convention's procedures are
exclusive (and therefore must be followed when a party to be served is
located abroad), or non-exclusive (allowing resort to other methods of
service; for example, those permitted under Rule 4(i) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure). In Volkswagen Atkiengesellschaft v.
16 Article 16.
17 Article 12.
18 Article 8.

19 Article 10.
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Schlunk,20 the Supreme Court held that the Hague Service Convention is
inapplicable where process can be validly served on a foreign corporation
by serving its U.S. subsidiary which, under state law, is treated as the
foreign parent's involuntary agent for service of process. Inasmuch as
the result in Schlunk turned on Illinois law, its application in other states
will depend on whether their internal law requires transmittal of documents abroad for purposes of service where a foreign party is involved,
thereby triggering the Convention, or alternatively, permits substituted
service of the type used in Schlunk.
Another vexing issue under the Convention is whether, absent a
state declaration of opposition, service by registered mail is permitted by
Article 10, paragraph (a), which, as noted, allows the "sending" of documents through postal channels. Courts have split on this issue in the
United States, with some courts construing "send" to mean "serve," and
others distinguishing the two terms.
Parties to the Hague Service Convention as a January 1, 1991
Antigua and Barbuda
Barbados
Belgium
Botswana
Canada
Cyprus
Czechoslovakia
Denmark
Egypt
Finland
II.

France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Israel
Italy
Japan
Luxembourg
Malawi
Netherlands

Norway
Portugal
Seychelles
Spain
Sweden
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States

CONVENTION ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE ABROAD IN CIVIL
OR COMMERCIAL MATTERS

Overview of the Convention
The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil
21
or Commercial Matters ("Hague Evidence Convention" or "Convention") was adopted at the Eleventh Session of the Hague Conference on
Private International Law. The United States was one of the first countries to ratify the Convention, to which nineteen other countries are now
party.
The Hague Evidence Convention represents an attempt to bridge
differences between the systems used by common law countries for taking
evidence abroad and those used by civil law countries. As its name sug20 486 U.S. 694 (1988).
7,
21 Done at The Hague, March 18, 1970; entered into force for the United States on October

U.S.C.A., note to 28
1972; 23 U.S.T. 2555; T.I.A.S. No. 7444; reprinted(with declarations) in 28
U.S.C. § 1781.
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gests, the Convention applies where evidence is to be obtained in one
signatory country for use in judicial proceedings of a "civil or commercial" nature in another signatory country. 2 The term "civil or commercial" is not defined in the Convention, but is interpreted by each country
according to its own law.
The Convention consists of forty-two articles divided into three
chapters. Chapter I deals with the taking of evidence via letters of request. Chapter II contains provisions for the taking of evidence by diplomatic or consular officials, and court-appointed commissioners. Chapter
III contains general provisions.
The basic method for the securing of evidence abroad contemplated
by the Convention is the letter of request, formerly called a letter or letters rogatory. The letter comprises a request from a judicial authority in
one country (the "requesting authority") to a judicial authority in another country (the "requested authority") for evidence (testimony or
documents) needed for a proceeding in the requesting country. The letter of request is transmitted through a "Central Authority" in the receiving state. Each state party to the Convention is required to designate a
"Central Authority" for this purpose.2"
Chapter I specifies what information must be contained in the letter
of request2 4 ; language requirements; 25 procedures for execution of a letter
of request, including the use of "special procedures" such as oaths, verbatim transcripts, cross-examination2 6 ; compulsory measures 27; the availability of testimonial privileges 28 ; grounds for
a refusal to execute a letter
30
of request 29 ; and permissible fees and costs.

As to the taking of evidence by diplomatic or consular officials,
Chapter II draws a distinction between the taking of evidence by such
officials from their own nationals, and the taking of evidence from nationals of their host countries or of third countries. Generally, prior permission from the host country is required in the latter but not the former
case, although a state may alter this by declaration.3s Most states have
made reservations relevant to these articles. Diplomatic and consular
officials have no power to compel testimony, but must apply to the courts
of the host state, which use their own standards and measures of compulsion. 32 The host state may regulate the conditions under which evidence
22 Article 1.
23 Article 2.
24 Article 3.
25 Article 4. States must accept a letter of request in English or French unless a contrary
reservation is made.
26 Article 9.
27 Article 10.
28 Article 11.
29 Article 12.
30 Article 14.
31 Articles 15 & 16.
32 Article 17.
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is taken by such officials.3 3
comChapter II allows the taking of evidence by court-appointed
34 but a concept
missioners, a familiar concept in U.S. civil procedure,
unknown in civil law jurisdictions prior to the Convention. Most civil
law countries have made reservations to this aspect of the Convention.
The Convention allows member states to permit the taking of evidence by methods other than those contemplated by the Convention. It
conmethods
also allows states to permit the taking of evidence by the
35
terms.
restrictive
less
under
but
templated by the Convention,
The Convention permits states to make a reservation to the requirement of Article 4(2), that they accept letters of request in English or
French (i.e., not necessarily in their own language). A number of states
have made reservations to the language provisions, and these should be
checked carefully for each country. Other states have disallowed all or
part of Chapter II, and many have imposed conditions and requirements
that should be carefully reviewed.
Finally, Article 23 of the Convention allows states to declare at the
time of ratification or accession that they will "not execute Letters of
pre-trial discovery of docuRequest issued for the purpose of obtaining' 36
countries.
common-law
in
ments as known
In 1978, a special commission appointed to study the operation of
the Convention approved a model form of a letter of request to be used in
37
drafting requests under the Convention.
Issues Arising under the Convention
The provision in Article 23 allowing declarations limiting pre-trial
discovery of documents received little attention at the time the Convention was ratified by the United States. In recent years, however, it has
been the focal point of virulent controversy between the United States
and other member states. Most member states have made declarations
either denying entirely, or severely limiting the discovery of documents.
Among the second group of countries, which includes the Scandinavian
countries, the declarations frequently include a specification of the kinds
of documentary request that will not be accepted (typically broad, nonspecific requests). This refusal to countenance "fishing expeditions" has
led U.S. litigants - typically, plaintiffs in product liability suits against
foreign defendants that have sold allegedly defective products on the U.S.
market - to seek discovery abroad from the foreign parties under the
more liberal procedures of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In doing so, litigants contend that the Convention, by virtue of Article 27, is
33 Article 19.

34 See Fed.R.Civ.P. 28(b).
35 Article 27.

36 Article 23.
37 The form is reprinted following the text of the Convention.
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not the exclusive and mandatory means of proceeding where a U.S. court
has jurisdiction over a foreign party.
After conflicting opinions in the lower courts, the United States
Supreme Court considered the relationship between the Convention and
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Socidtd Nationale Industrielle
Aerospatiale v. U.S. District Court.3 8 The Court ruled, five to four, that
the Convention is not the exclusive and mandatory means of obtaining
foreign evidence. At the same time, the Court held that the Convention
cannot be disregarded whenever a U.S. court has jurisdiction over a foreign party from whom evidence is sought. In the majority's view, trial
courts should use their discretion, based on the facts of a particular case,
in determining the extent to which the use of Convention procedures
should be required.
The Aerospatialedecision effectively permits U.S. courts to avoid the
Convention, except where evidence is sought from third-party witnesses
who are not subject to their personal jurisdiction. Although the Supreme
Court's decision is viewed by some as a response to the intransigent attitude of many Hague Evidence Convention countries towards discovery,
the decision could prove detrimental in the long term, depending on its
application by the lower courts. For example, it may well affect the willingness of a foreign country to recognize and enforce any ensuing
judgment.
Partiesto the Hague Evidence Convention as of January L 1991
Argentina
Barbados
Cyprus
Czechoslovakia
Denmark
Finland
France
Federal Republic of Germany
Israel
Italy

Luxembourg
Monaco
Netherlands
Norway
Portugal
Singapore
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom
United States

III. THE FOREIGN SovEREIGN IMMUNITIES AcT OF 1976
HistoricalBackground
For more than a century and a half, the United States generally
granted foreign sovereigns complete immunity from suits in U.S. courts.
In the The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon,39 Chief Justice Marshall
concluded that, while the jurisdiction of a nation within its own territory
38

482 U.S. 522 (1987).

39 7 Cranch 116 (1812).
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'
"is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself," the United States
had impliedly waived jurisdiction over certain activities of foreign sovereigns. Although the narrow holding of The Schooner Exchange was that
the courts lack jurisdiction over an armed ship of a foreign state found in
a U.S. port, that opinion came to be regarded as extending virtually abso4
lute immunity to foreign sovereigns. '
As The Schooner Exchange made clear, however, foreign sovereign
immunity is a matter of grace and comity on the part of the United
States, and not a restriction imposed by the Constitution. Accordingly,
the Supreme Court has consistently deferred to the decisions of the political branches, in particular, those of the Executive Branch, on whether to
exercise jurisdiction over actions against foreign sovereigns and their
instrumentalities.42
Until 1952, the State Department uniformly certified immunity in
all actions against friendly foreign sovereigns. But in the 1952 "Tate Letter", the State Department announced its adoption of the "restrictive"
theory of foreign sovereign immunity. Under this theory immunity is
confined to suits involving the foreign sovereign's public acts, (fure imperil), and does not extend to cases arising out of a foreign state's strictly
commercial or "private" acts, (fure gestionis).
The restrictive theory was not initially enacted into law, however,
and its application proved troublesome. As in the past, initial responsibility for deciding questions of sovereign immunity fell primarily upon
the Executive Branch acting through the State Department. Since the
courts abided by the "suggestions of immunity" filed by the Executive
Branch, foreign nations often placed diplomatic pressure on the State
Department in seeking immunity. On occasion, political considerations
led to suggestions of immunity in cases where immmunity would not
have been available under the restrictive theory.
An additional complication was that foreign nations did not always
make requests to the State Department. In such cases, the responsibility
fell to the courts to determine whether sovereign immunity existed. This
was generally done by reference to prior State Department decisions.
Thus, sovereign immunity determinations were made in two different
branches, subject to a variety of factors, occasionally including political
considerations. Not surprisingly, the governing standards were neither
clear nor uniformly applied. 3
In 1976, Congress passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
("FSIA") in order to free the Government from the case-by-case diplomatic pressures, to clarify the governing standards, and to "assur[e] liti40 Id. at 136.

41 See, eg., Berizzi Brothers Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
42 See, e.g., Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943); Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945).
43 See, Weber, The ForeignSovereign Immunities Act of1976: Its Origin, Meaning and Effect, 3
YALE STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 1, 11-13, 15-17 (1976).
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gants that... decisions are made on purely legal grounds and under
procedures that insure due process." 44 To accomplish these objectives,
the FSIA contains a comprehensive set of legal standards governing
claims of immunity in every civil action against a foreign state and its
political subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities.
Synopsis of the Act
The FSIA codifies, as a matter of federal law, the restrictive theory
of sovereign immunity. Therefore, a foreign state is normally immune
from the jurisdiction of federal and state courts, 45 subject to a set of exceptions specified in §§ 1605 and 1607. Those exceptions include actions
in which the foreign state has explicitly or impliedly waived its immunity, actions based upon commercial activities of the foreign sovereign
carried on in the United States or causing a direct effect in the United
States, and actions for damages for tortious injury caused in the United
States. When one of the specified exceptions applies, "the foreign state
shall be liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a private
individual under like circumstances.""
The FSIA expressly provides that its standards control in "the
courts of the United States and of the States,"'4 7 and thus clearly contemplates that such suits may be brought in either federal or state courts.
However, "i[n] view of the potential sensitivity of actions against foreign
states and the importance of developing a uniform body of law in this
area,"' 48 the FSIA guarantees foreign states the right to remove any civil
action from a state court to a federal court.49 If one of the specified
exceptions to sovereign immunity applies, a federal or state court may
exercise subject matter jurisdiction under § 1330(a). If the claim does
not fall within one of the exceptions, U.S. courts are incompetent to hear
the case.
The Supreme Court has firmly established that the FSIA is the sole
and exclusive jurisdictional basis for suits against foreign states and their
agencies and instrumentalities, including foreign state owned corporations or other legal entities.50

IV.

ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN STATE JUDGMENTS

The Uniform Foreign

51
Money Judgments Recognition Act

" H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, at 7 (1976).

45 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1991).
46 § 1606.

47 § 1604.
48 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, at 32 (1976).
49 § 1441(d).

50 Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989); erlinden B. V v.
CentralBank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 (1983).
51 The aim of the adoption of the Act by several states, (e.g., New York), was not so much to
aid recognition of foreign judgments, but to enhance the prospect of recognition of domestic judg-
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("Act"), which has now been adopted by twenty states, is generally regarded as a codification of preexisting common law principles as to when
U.S. courts will recognize and enforce money judgments rendered
abroad. The Act will be used in this paper as a convenient outline for a
synopsis of the principles governing recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.
"ForeignState" and "Judgment" Defined
Subdivision (1) of § 1 defines a "foreign state" as any governmental
unit other than those listed. The jurisdictions listed are American jurisdictions. Their courts' judgments get full faith and credit and can be
summarily registered in most states of the American Union. Thus, state
court judgments do not need assistance from the Act.
Subdivision (2) clarifies subdivision (1) in that the section applies
only to money judgments and excludes from recognition judgments for
taxes, fines, or penalties, as well as support judgments in matrimonial
and family matters.
Finality
Only foreign judgments that are "final, conclusive and enforceable"
are subject to enforcement. This excludes all intermediate and interlocutory determinations, including money judgments, if, under the law of the
rendering jurisdiction, there is any impediment to their immediate enforcement. The only stated exception is when an appeal is pending or
when the judgment is subject to appeal. An appeal as such does not
prevent the judgment from being deemed final.
There may well be good reason for seeking to at least start an action
in the United States on the foreign judgment even though an appeal is
pending in the foreign jurisdiction. If the judgment debtor has assets in
the United States, the commencement of an enforcement action may support an application for52an order of attachment to preserve assets until the
action is determined.
Recognition and Procedurefor Enforcement
Unless one of the grounds listed in § 4 of the Act for refusing recognition is applicable, § 3 requires that our courts treat the foreign judgment as conclusive. Ordinarily, it will be a judgment creditor who will
seek to invoke the provisions of the Act to enforce the judgment, but the
section applies as well to a judgment which "denies" recovery of money.
Thus, a defendant in a foreign action who prevailed against the plaintiff's
ments by foreign courts. In states which do not recognize and enforce U.S. judgments unless it is
shown that the U.S. reciprocates, the Act makes the requisite showing of reciprocity. A statutory
manifestation is more convincing than case law to the courts of some of these nations, especially
those under the civil law system.
52 See also § 6.
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money claim is just as entitled to have the judgment deemed binding in
his favor as the plaintiff is when he prevails. The second sentence of § 3
allows the judgment to be interposed as an "affirmative defense."
A judgment creditor with a foreign money judgment may convert it
into a domestic judgment either by bringing an ordinary action on the
judgment or, in some states, by proceeding under statutes which permit
the judgment creditor to accompany a summons with a set of motion
papers and move for summary judgment.5 3
Once converted into a domestic judgment, the foreign judgment becomes enforceable like a domestic judgment.
Groundsfor Refusing Recognition
Section 4 permits refusal to recognize a foreign judgment on a variety of grounds. Subdivision (a) of § 4 states three mandatory grounds
which precluded U.S. courts from recognizing the foreign judgment.
Each cited ground, i.e., the want of an impartial tribunal and fair procedures, the lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant, and lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, are long-established grounds for refusing recognition under preexisting law. The want of personal jurisdiction would,
in the United States, mean that our domestic concept of due process was
not satisfied in the foreign forum, thus precluding recognition of the
judgment on constitutional grounds.
In determining whether the foreign court had personal jurisdiction
over the defendant, the domestic law of the state where enforcement is
sought must be consulted. If the foreign court's personal jurisdiction accords with domestic laws, recognition may not be refused for lack of
personal jurisdiction, although recognition may be refused on one of the
six discretionary grounds set forth in subdivision (b) of § 4.
Lack of notice and opportunity to defend in the foreign forum is a
ground for refusing recognition under paragraph (1). This goes to the
roots of due process in the United States, and therefore, makes a refusal
to recognize the judgment constitutionally mandatory rather than, as
subdivision (b) of § 4 would have it, discretionary.
The "public policy" objection of paragraph (3) is a traditional
ground for protection in international agreements which are analogous to
the Act. For example, the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, which the United
States has ratified, includes in Article V, § 2(b), as a reason for refusing
to enforce an arbitral award, that it would be "contrary to the public
policy" of the country where enforcement is sought.
A refusal to recognize a foreign judgment because it conflicts "with
another final and conclusive judgment," the ground stated in paragraph
53 A judgment of a foreign country may not be enforced by registration, which is available only
for the judgments of courts of the United States. See, eg., 28 U.S.C. § 1963.
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(4), should occur only when some reason is shown why the latter judgment should have priority.
The ground in paragraph (5) involves what is known as an "ouster"
agreement, whereby the parties stipulate that disputes shall be settled
only in particular courts, thereby "ousting" all other jurisdictions. If another forum has assumed jurisdiction despite the ouster, its judgment can
be refused recognition under paragraph (5).
Paragraph (5) also covers the situation in which the foreign court
assumed jurisdiction, over the objection of a party, concerning a dispute
which both sides had agreed to submit to arbitration or to a similar extrajudicial dispute settlement machinery. Thus, if it appears that the judgment creditor deliberately sought out a court in a jurisdiction hostile to
arbitration, even though he agreed to arbitrate, he can be denied the
fruits of the judgment.
Paragraph (6) permits a refusal of recognition if the foreign court
can be shown to have been a "seriously inconvenient" forum. This
ground applies only if the court's jurisdiction rested solely on local service of process on the judgment debtor, i.e., where there was no other
jurisdictional nexus.
Bases for PersonalJurisdiction
As noted earlier, subdivision (a)(2) of § 4 provides that a foreign
judgment may not be enforced if the rendering court lacked personal jurisdiction over the judgment debtor. Subdivision (a) of § 5 then sets
forth a list of bases deemed adequate for the exercise of personal jurisdiction, thus removing the barrier of § 4(a)(2) if one of the listed bases is
present.
To begin with, mere personal service within the foreign country assures jurisdiction under paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of § 5. U.S.
courts would be hypocritical to hold otherwise, since American law still
recognizes local service even upon a transient as a basis for personal jurisdiction.5 4 Recognition may, however, be refused when service was the
sole jurisdictional basis if it is also shown that the foreign forum was a
"seriously inconvenient" one.55
Under paragraph (2), voluntary appearance in the foreign proceedings submits the defendant to the court's jurisdiction. There are, however, two exceptions. The first exception is when the appearance was
solely to protect property seized in the foreign place. This exception acknowledges that the need to protect property may sometimes compel a
submission to jurisdiction when foreign law allows such coercive use of
the property's coincidental presence. An appearance under such circumstances would be an especially sympathetic point for the judgment debtor
if the property was unrelated to the underlying dispute.
54 See, Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990).

51 § 4(b)(7).
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The second exception in paragraph (2) is when the appearance was
solely for the purpose of challenging jurisdiction, what used to be termed
a "special appearance." If the judgment debtor did more than preserve
his jurisdictional objection in the foreign court, he will be deemed to have
submitted voluntarily to its jurisdiction and to have forfeited the right to
claim an exception for himself under paragraph (2).
The remaining grounds listed in subdivision (a) of § 5 are analogous
to those which are now generally recognized for extraterritorial jurisdiction. Paragraph (3) recognizes a contractual submission. Paragraph (4)
recognizes domicile on the part of an individual defendant and place of
incorporation, or the "doing business" test in the case of a corporate
defendant. Paragraph (5) acknowledges a type of "long arm" jurisdiction analogous, if not identical, to the "transaction of business" test.
Paragraph (6) involves a combination of a general long arm statute and
the more specialized alternatives of a traditional nonresident motorist
statute.
The bases listed in subdivision (a) of § 5 are by no means exclusive.
A state is free, under subdivision (b), to recognize in respect of the foreign judgment any other jurisdictional basis which that state's law finds
congenial.

